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China-Linked Hackers Target Asian Governments, NATO State, Journalists, and Activists Cybersecurity researchers have disclosed details of a new China-aligned espionage campaign targeting government and defense sectors across South, East, and Southeast Asia, along with one European gove ... Read more Published Date: May 01, 2026 (3 days ago) Vulnerabilities has been mentioned in this article. CVE-2026-33626 CVE-2026-32202 CVE-2026-3854 CVE-2025-55182

CVE ID :CVE-2026-31719 Published : May 1, 2026, 1:56 p.m. | 22 minutes ago Description :In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: crypto: krb5enc - fix async decrypt skipping hash verification krb5enc_dispatch_decrypt() sets req->base.complete as the skcipher callback, which is the caller's own completion handler. When the skcipher completes asynchronously, this signals "done" to the caller without executing krb5enc_dispatch_decrypt_hash(), completely bypassing the integrity verification (hash check). Compare with the encrypt path which correctly uses krb5enc_encrypt_done as an intermediate callback to chain into the hash computation on async completion. Fix by adding krb5enc_decrypt_done as an intermediate callback that chains into krb5enc_dispatch_decrypt_hash() upon async skcipher completion, matching the encrypt path's callback pattern. Also fix EBUSY/EINPROGRESS handling throughout: remove krb5enc_request_complete() which incorrectly swallowed EINPROGRESS notifications that must be passed up to callers waiting on backlogged requests, and add missing EBUSY checks in krb5enc_encrypt_ahash_done for the dispatch_encrypt return value. Unset MAY_BACKLOG on the async completion path so the user won't see back-to-back EINPROGRESS notifications. Severity: 0.0 | NA Visit the link for more details, such as CVSS details, affected products, timeline, and more...

CVE ID :CVE-2026-31717 Published : May 1, 2026, 1:56 p.m. | 22 minutes ago Description :In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ksmbd: validate owner of durable handle on reconnect Currently, ksmbd does not verify if the user attempting to reconnect to a durable handle is the same user who originally opened the file. This allows any authenticated user to hijack an orphaned durable handle by predicting or brute-forcing the persistent ID. According to MS-SMB2, the server MUST verify that the SecurityContext of the reconnect request matches the SecurityContext associated with the existing open. Add a durable_owner structure to ksmbd_file to store the original opener's UID, GID, and account name. and catpure the owner information when a file handle becomes orphaned. and implementing ksmbd_vfs_compare_durable_owner() to validate the identity of the requester during SMB2_CREATE (DHnC). Severity: 0.0 | NA Visit the link for more details, such as CVSS details, affected products, timeline, and more...

CVE ID :CVE-2026-31718 Published : May 1, 2026, 1:56 p.m. | 22 minutes ago Description :In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ksmbd: fix use-after-free in __ksmbd_close_fd() via durable scavenger When a durable file handle survives session disconnect (TCP close without SMB2_LOGOFF), session_fd_check() sets fp->conn = NULL to preserve the handle for later reconnection. However, it did not clean up the byte-range locks on fp->lock_list. Later, when the durable scavenger thread times out and calls __ksmbd_close_fd(NULL, fp), the lock cleanup loop did: spin_lock(&fp->conn->llist_lock); This caused a slab use-after-free because fp->conn was NULL and the original connection object had already been freed by ksmbd_tcp_disconnect(). The root cause is asymmetric cleanup: lock entries (smb_lock->clist) were left dangling on the freed conn->lock_list while fp->conn was nulled out. To fix this issue properly, we need to handle the lifetime of smb_lock->clist across three paths: - Safely skip clist deletion when list is empty and fp->conn is NULL. - Remove the lock from the old connection's lock_list in session_fd_check() - Re-add the lock to the new connection's lock_list in ksmbd_reopen_durable_fd(). Severity: 0.0 | NA Visit the link for more details, such as CVSS details, affected products, timeline, and more...

CVE ID :CVE-2026-31716 Published : May 1, 2026, 1:56 p.m. | 22 minutes ago Description :In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fs/ntfs3: validate rec->used in journal-replay file record check check_file_record() validates rec->total against the record size but never validates rec->used. The do_action() journal-replay handlers read rec->used from disk and use it to compute memmove lengths: DeleteAttribute: memmove(attr, ..., used - asize - roff) CreateAttribute: memmove(..., attr, used - roff) change_attr_size: memmove(..., used - PtrOffset(rec, next)) When rec->used is smaller than the offset of a validated attribute, or larger than the record size, these subtractions can underflow allowing us to copy huge amounts of memory in to a 4kb buffer, generally considered a bad idea overall. This requires a corrupted filesystem, which isn't a threat model the kernel really needs to worry about, but checking for such an obvious out-of-bounds value is good to keep things robust, especially on journal replay Fix this up by bounding rec->used correctly. This is much like commit b2bc7c44ed17 ("fs/ntfs3: Fix slab-out-of-bounds read in DeleteIndexEntryRoot") which checked different values in this same switch statement. Severity: 0.0 | NA Visit the link for more details, such as CVSS details, affected products, timeline, and more...

CVE ID :CVE-2026-31715 Published : May 1, 2026, 1:56 p.m. | 22 minutes ago Description :In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: f2fs: fix UAF caused by decrementing sbi->nr_pages[] in f2fs_write_end_io() The xfstests case "generic/107" and syzbot have both reported a NULL pointer dereference. The concurrent scenario that triggers the panic is as follows: F2FS_WB_CP_DATA write callback umount - f2fs_write_checkpoint - f2fs_wait_on_all_pages(sbi, F2FS_WB_CP_DATA) - blk_mq_end_request - bio_endio - f2fs_write_end_io : dec_page_count(sbi, F2FS_WB_CP_DATA) : wake_up(&sbi->cp_wait) - kill_f2fs_super - kill_block_super - f2fs_put_super : iput(sbi->node_inode) : sbi->node_inode = NULL : f2fs_in_warm_node_list - is_node_folio // sbi->node_inode is NULL and panic The root cause is that f2fs_put_super() calls iput(sbi->node_inode) and sets sbi->node_inode to NULL after sbi->nr_pages[F2FS_WB_CP_DATA] is decremented to zero. As a result, f2fs_in_warm_node_list() may dereference a NULL node_inode when checking whether a folio belongs to the node inode, leading to a panic. This patch fixes the issue by calling f2fs_in_warm_node_list() before decrementing sbi->nr_pages[F2FS_WB_CP_DATA], thus preventing the use-after-free condition. Severity: 0.0 | NA Visit the link for more details, such as CVSS details, affected products, timeline, and more...

CVE ID :CVE-2026-31714 Published : May 1, 2026, 1:56 p.m. | 22 minutes ago Description :In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: f2fs: fix to avoid memory leak in f2fs_rename() syzbot reported a f2fs bug as below: BUG: memory leak unreferenced object 0xffff888127f70830 (size 16): comm "syz.0.23", pid 6144, jiffies 4294943712 hex dump (first 16 bytes): 3c af 57 72 5b e6 8f ad 6e 8e fd 33 42 39 03 ff Severity: 0.0 | NA Visit the link for more details, such as CVSS details, affected products, timeline, and more...

CVE ID :CVE-2026-31713 Published : May 1, 2026, 1:56 p.m. | 22 minutes ago Description :In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fuse: abort on fatal signal during sync init When sync init is used and the server exits for some reason (error, crash) while processing FUSE_INIT, the filesystem creation will hang. The reason is that while all other threads will exit, the mounting thread (or process) will keep the device fd open, which will prevent an abort from happening. This is a regression from the async mount case, where the mount was done first, and the FUSE_INIT processing afterwards, in which case there's no such recursive syscall keeping the fd open. Severity: 0.0 | NA Visit the link for more details, such as CVSS details, affected products, timeline, and more...

CVE ID :CVE-2026-31712 Published : May 1, 2026, 1:56 p.m. | 22 minutes ago Description :In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ksmbd: require minimum ACE size in smb_check_perm_dacl() Both ACE-walk loops in smb_check_perm_dacl() only guard against an under-sized remaining buffer, not against an ACE whose declared `ace->size` is smaller than the struct it claims to describe: if (offsetof(struct smb_ace, access_req) > aces_size) break; ace_size = le16_to_cpu(ace->size); if (ace_size > aces_size) break; The first check only requires the 4-byte ACE header to be in bounds; it does not require access_req (4 bytes at offset 4) to be readable. An attacker who has set a crafted DACL on a file they own can declare ace->size == 4 with aces_size == 4, pass both checks, and then granted |= le32_to_cpu(ace->access_req); /* upper loop */ compare_sids(&sid, &ace->sid); /* lower loop */ reads access_req at offset 4 (OOB by up to 4 bytes) and ace->sid at offset 8 (OOB by up to CIFS_SID_BASE_SIZE + SID_MAX_SUB_AUTHORITIES * 4 bytes). Tighten both loops to require ace_size >= offsetof(struct smb_ace, sid) + CIFS_SID_BASE_SIZE which is the smallest valid on-wire ACE layout (4-byte header + 4-byte access_req + 8-byte sid base with zero sub-auths). Also reject ACEs whose sid.num_subauth exceeds SID_MAX_SUB_AUTHORITIES before letting compare_sids() dereference sub_auth[] entries. parse_sec_desc() already enforces an equivalent check (lines 441-448); smb_check_perm_dacl() simply grew weaker validation over time. Reachability: authenticated SMB client with permission to set an ACL on a file. On a subsequent CREATE against that file, the kernel walks the stored DACL via smb_check_perm_dacl() and triggers the OOB read. Not pre-auth, and the OOB read is not reflected to the attacker, but KASAN reports and kernel state corruption are possible. Severity: 0.0 | NA Visit the link for more details, such as CVSS details, affected products, timeline, and more...

CVE ID :CVE-2026-31710 Published : May 1, 2026, 1:56 p.m. | 22 minutes ago Description :In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb: client: fix dir separator in SMB1 UNIX mounts When calling cifs_mount_get_tcon() with SMB1 UNIX mounts, @cifs_sb->mnt_cifs_flags needs to be read or updated only after calling reset_cifs_unix_caps(), otherwise it might end up with missing CIFS_MOUNT_POSIXACL and CIFS_MOUNT_POSIX_PATHS bits. This fixes the wrong dir separator used in paths caused by the missing CIFS_MOUNT_POSIX_PATHS bit in cifs_sb_info::mnt_cifs_flags. Severity: 0.0 | NA Visit the link for more details, such as CVSS details, affected products, timeline, and more...

CVE ID :CVE-2026-31711 Published : May 1, 2026, 1:56 p.m. | 22 minutes ago Description :In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb: server: fix active_num_conn leak on transport allocation failure Commit 77ffbcac4e56 ("smb: server: fix leak of active_num_conn in ksmbd_tcp_new_connection()") addressed the kthread_run() failure path. The earlier alloc_transport() == NULL path in the same function has the same leak, is reachable pre-authentication via any TCP connect to port 445, and was empirically reproduced on UML (ARCH=um, v7.0-rc7): a small number of forced allocation failures were sufficient to put ksmbd into a state where every subsequent connection attempt was rejected for the remainder of the boot. ksmbd_kthread_fn() increments active_num_conn before calling ksmbd_tcp_new_connection() and discards the return value, so when alloc_transport() returns NULL the socket is released and -ENOMEM returned without decrementing the counter. Each such failure permanently consumes one slot from the max_connections pool; once cumulative failures reach the cap, atomic_inc_return() hits the threshold on every subsequent accept and every new connection is rejected. The counter is only reset by module reload. An unauthenticated remote attacker can drive the server toward the memory pressure that makes alloc_transport() fail by holding open connections with large RFC1002 lengths up to MAX_STREAM_PROT_LEN (0x00FFFFFF); natural transient allocation failures on a loaded host produce the same drift more slowly. Mirror the existing rollback pattern in ksmbd_kthread_fn(): on the alloc_transport() failure path, decrement active_num_conn gated on server_conf.max_connections. Repro details: with the patch reverted, forced alloc_transport() NULL returns leaked counter slots and subsequent connection attempts -- including legitimate connects issued after the forced-fail window had closed -- were all rejected with "Limit the maximum number of connections". Wi...

CVE ID :CVE-2026-31709 Published : May 1, 2026, 1:56 p.m. | 22 minutes ago Description :In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb: client: validate the whole DACL before rewriting it in cifsacl build_sec_desc() and id_mode_to_cifs_acl() derive a DACL pointer from a server-supplied dacloffset and then use the incoming ACL to rebuild the chmod/chown security descriptor. The original fix only checked that the struct smb_acl header fits before reading dacl_ptr->size or dacl_ptr->num_aces. That avoids the immediate header-field OOB read, but the rewrite helpers still walk ACEs based on pdacl->num_aces with no structural validation of the incoming DACL body. A malicious server can return a truncated DACL that still contains a header, claims one or more ACEs, and then drive replace_sids_and_copy_aces() or set_chmod_dacl() past the validated extent while they compare or copy attacker-controlled ACEs. Factor the DACL structural checks into validate_dacl(), extend them to validate each ACE against the DACL bounds, and use the shared validator before the chmod/chown rebuild paths. parse_dacl() reuses the same validator so the read-side parser and write-side rewrite paths agree on what constitutes a well-formed incoming DACL. Severity: 0.0 | NA Visit the link for more details, such as CVSS details, affected products, timeline, and more...