News & Sicurezza

CVE ID :CVE-2026-21755 Published : Aug. 24, 2026, 3:16 p.m. | 47 minutes ago Description :HCL Hive is affected by a missing rate limit which could allow an attacker unauthorized access via brute-force or credential stuffing attacks, or cause a denial of service. Severity: 5.3 | MEDIUM Visit the link for more details, such as CVSS details, affected products, timeline, and more...

CVE ID :CVE-2026-39914 Published : Aug. 24, 2026, 3:16 p.m. | 47 minutes ago Description :TIM Flow before 26.0.6 contains an improper authorization vulnerability that allows any authenticated user to submit arbitrary SQL queries to a privileged dashboard Excel export endpoint intended for administrative use only. Attackers can craft and submit unauthorized SQL queries to the export endpoint to retrieve sensitive database contents as a downloadable spreadsheet, bypassing role-based access controls. Severity: 7.1 | HIGH Visit the link for more details, such as CVSS details, affected products, timeline, and more...

⚡ Weekly Recap: AI-Powered PLC Attacks, GitLab Attacks, Stripe Key Leaks and More A package gets installed. A login prompt opens. A box sits exposed to the internet. Nothing looks unusual yet. That’s roughly the mood this week. Trusted tools turn hostile, old weak spots get fresh a ... Read more Published Date: Aug 24, 2026 (3 days, 7 hours ago) Vulnerabilities has been mentioned in this article.

A flaw was found in rpmbuild. When rpmbuild processes a crafted tarball in tarball mode, a specially designed tar member name can lead to macro injection. This vulnerability allows a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code on the system by convincing a user to build a malicious tarball.

A vulnerability was determined in SourceCodester Simple Online Food Ordering System 1.0. Impacted is an unknown function of the file /fos/admin/ajax.php?action=save_settings. This manipulation of the argument Name causes sql injection. The attack is possible to be carried out remotely. The exploit has been publicly disclosed and may be utilized.

TypeORM's SelectQueryBuilder.distinctOn accepts an array of strings and stores it on the expression map without validation. For PostgreSQL-family drivers, createSelectDistinctExpression in src/query-builder/SelectQueryBuilder.ts joins that array and interpolates the result into the generated statement as SELECT DISTINCT ON (values), with no escaping, quoting, identifier validation or allowlist, and without routing the values through replacePropertyNames or the driver's escape helper. Because the interpolation point is a parenthesized SQL expression list rather than an identifier-only position, a supplied element may carry arbitrary expressions, including correlated subqueries. An application that forwards a client-controlled value into distinctOn, for instance to let a caller choose a deduplication column, allows that client to read data anywhere the application's database role can reach through boolean or time-based inference, independently of the entity being queried. validateOrderByCondition, the allowlist check guarding the orderBy family in the same class, is not applied to this path.

act starts an HTTP Artifacts V4 backend whenever a workflow uses actions/upload-artifact@v4 or actions/download-artifact@v4. The control-plane RPCs of that backend, including CreateArtifact, GetSignedArtifactURL, ListArtifacts, FinalizeArtifact and DeleteArtifact, accept a caller-supplied workflow_run_backend_id and never check that it belongs to the requester: validateRunIDV4 in pkg/artifacts/artifacts_v4.go parses the value and returns it with the comparison against the requesting task's run ID left commented out. The signed URLs the backend issues are authenticated by an HMAC whose key is hardcoded to the four bytes 0xba 0xdb 0xee 0xf0, identical in every build, computed over a concatenation of endpoint, expiry, artifact name and task ID with no length prefix or delimiter, so signatures are both forgeable and ambiguous between differing artifact name and task ID pairs. The --artifact-server-addr flag defaults to the host's outbound address rather than loopback, leaving the backend reachable from the surrounding network. Any client that can reach it may read, overwrite or delete the artifacts of a concurrently running job with no credentials, exposing build outputs such as secrets and deployment credentials and permitting their replacement before the owning job consumes them.

webpack-dev-middleware resolves a request to a local file in getFilenameFromUrl by testing the request pathname against a traversal guard and then slicing it at a fixed character offset. The guard, UP_PATH_REGEXP applied to path.normalize(`./${pathname}`), only matches ".." that stands as a whole path segment, while the containment test is the string comparison pathname.startsWith(publicPathPathname) and the file path is built as path.join(outputPath, pathname.slice(publicPathPathname.length)). When the configured publicPath has no trailing slash, a request such as GET /assets../.env against publicPath /assets yields the pathname /assets../.env, whose only dot-dot sits inside the segment "assets.." and so passes the guard, but the offset slice cuts within that segment and hands "../.env" to path.join, resolving one directory above outputPath. Reading a file from that path requires the middleware to be backed by the physical filesystem, which happens when writeToDisk is true or a custom outputFileSystem is supplied, since the default memfs volume holds only build output. Traversal depth is limited to a single directory because a separately delimited dot-dot segment is collapsed during URL parsing before the guard runs. The default publicPath value of "auto" resolves to "/" and is not affected. This is an incomplete fix for CVE-2024-29180: the guard and offset slice were introduced by that fix and are present in every release from 5.3.4, 6.1.2 and 7.1.0 onward.

The official Flair wheels for 0.15.0 and 0.15.1 still contain flair/models/clustering.py, whose ClusteringModel.load static method returns pickle.loads(joblib.load(str(model_file))) and so executes arbitrary Python while loading a model file. Loading a model supplied by an attacker therefore runs that attacker's code with the privileges of the loading process. This is the same sink and the same file as CVE-2024-10073, which records 0.15.0 as the fixed version on the basis that clustering support was dropped in that release; the module was removed from the documented API but remains present in the distributed artifact and reachable by importing flair.models.clustering directly, so the earlier record's fixed version does not hold for the shipped package.

The Mercado Pago Node.js SDK interpolates caller-supplied identifiers into API request paths without percent-encoding them, so characters that are structural in a URL survive into the outgoing request. The payment (get, capture, cancel), paymentRefund (create, total, list, get), advancedPayment (get, capture, cancel, update, updateReleaseDate) and disbursementRefund (create, createAll, listAll) clients build their path as a template literal, for example RestClient.fetch(`/v1/payments/${id}`, ...) in src/clients/payment/get/index.ts. A dot-dot or slash sequence in the identifier is normalised by the WHATWG URL parser and redirects the request to a different endpoint, and a question mark appends attacker-chosen query parameters, in both cases carrying the merchant's own access token. An application that forwards an identifier influenced by an untrusted party into one of these methods without an ownership check therefore allows that party to reach other resources within the merchant's token scope. The repository already contains the intended helper, encodePathParam in src/utils/path.ts, which pull request 451 applied to roughly 29 other clients while leaving these unchanged.

Xinference loads models with Hugging Face remote code execution unconditionally enabled, and before version 2.12.0 exposes no setting to disable it. Six loader call sites pass trust_remote_code=True as a literal or as an unconditional default: RerankModel._get_tokenizer in xinference/model/rerank/core.py, SentenceTransformerRerankModel.load in xinference/model/rerank/sentence_transformers/core.py, SentenceTransformerEmbeddingModel.load in xinference/model/embedding/sentence_transformers/core.py, FlagEmbeddingModel.load in xinference/model/embedding/flag/core.py, and two sites in xinference/model/llm/transformers/core.py where PytorchModel._sanitize_model_config and PytorchModel._get_components default the value to True. Because a caller with model launch access can register a model whose type is unknown and supply an arbitrary model path, the server reaches _auto_detect_type and then AutoTokenizer.from_pretrained, which imports and executes Python declared by the model directory's own tokenizer_config.json auto_map, running attacker-supplied code with the privileges of the worker process. Version 2.12.0 gates every site behind allow_trust_remote_code and the XINFERENCE_TRUST_REMOTE_CODE setting, permitting remote code only for bundled built-in models.

RustDesk's Windows clipboard redirection copies a peer-supplied length into a fixed-size caller buffer without an upper bound check. When an OLE paste consumer such as explorer.exe calls IStream::Read with a buffer of cb bytes, CliprdrStream_Read in libs/clipboard/src/windows/wf_cliprdr.c requests that many bytes of a remote file through cliprdr_send_request_filecontents and then executes CopyMemory(pv, clipboard->req_fdata, clipboard->req_fsize), where req_fsize is taken verbatim from the peer's CLIPRDR FileContentsResponse by wf_cliprdr_server_file_contents_response (req_fsize = fileContentsResponse->cbRequested) and is never clamped to cb anywhere in the chain. The function's only length comparison, req_fsize < cb, handles the short-read case and is evaluated after the copy has already occurred. A malicious or compromised peer that answers a small file-contents read with an oversized response therefore writes attacker-chosen data past the end of the paste consumer's heap buffer when the local user pastes clipboard file contents offered by the remote side. The file is a fork of FreeRDP's client/Windows/wf_cliprdr.c, where the same defect is CVE-2026-68579, fixed in FreeRDP 3.30.0.