News & Sicurezza

openssl_encrypt versions before 1.4.9 fail to validate server URLs in login and register_with_email functions, accepting unencrypted http:// URLs and unconfigured hosts. Attackers on the network path can intercept cleartext credentials including client_id, passwords, and JWTs to achieve full keyserver account takeover.

openssl-encrypt (pip package) before 1.4.9 contains a symlink-following flaw in its verify-usb v2 added-file allowlist scan. The scan enumerated the drive with rglob(), which in CPython does not descend into symlinked directories and treats the symlink as an ordinary directory, while O_NOFOLLOW on the hash side binds only the final path component. An evil-maid attacker with physical access to the removable drive could replace a tool-tree directory with a symlink to a copy containing byte-identical files plus a planted __pycache__/*.pyc file (which CPython loads in preference to recompiling the clean .py). The planted file is never enumerated, added_files stays 0, and verify-usb reports PASSED, resulting in code execution when the victim runs the portable install. Fixed in 1.4.9 (affects both 1.4.x and 1.5.x lines).

openssl_encrypt versions before 1.4.9 derive the remote-pepper wrap key using unsalted HKDF-SHA256 or bare SHA-256 of the password, allowing identical keys across all users and files. Attackers with access to wrapped pepper blobs can precompute a single dictionary table and perform fleet-wide offline password guessing at hardware speed to recover user passwords.

openssl_encrypt versions before 1.4.9 store an unkeyed SHA-256 hash of the plaintext in the cleartext file header metadata. Attackers can read this hash without the password to confirm guessed plaintexts offline or fingerprint identical plaintexts across separately-encrypted files.

openssl_encrypt (pip package openssl-encrypt) versions 1.4.8 and earlier store an mTLS client private key in cleartext within a world-readable (0644) SharedPreferences file via the desktop GUI's Settings screen 'combined certificate and private key' PEM field. A local attacker with file system access can read the exposed private key. Version 1.4.9 writes the PEM to a dedicated 0600 file, keeps only its path in SharedPreferences, and migrates/scrubs existing cleartext values.

OpenRemote versions before 1.28.0 contain a cross-realm information disclosure vulnerability in the Notification REST API that allows per-realm tenant administrators to read all tenants' sent notifications including message bodies. Attackers with read:admin credentials in one realm can submit a zero-parameter GET request to the notification endpoint to retrieve sensitive notification metadata and message content from all realms.

AVideo before 24.0 contains a server-side request forgery vulnerability in the isSSRFSafeURL function that fails to extract embedded IPv4 addresses from NAT64, 6to4, and Teredo IPv6 transition address formats. Unauthenticated attackers can bypass SSRF protections via the LiveLinks proxy endpoint to reach internal services and cloud metadata endpoints by encoding private IPv4 targets in transition address formats.

Baserow dispatches an Application Builder data source without acting on the result of its permission check. The dispatch and record-name views in backend/src/baserow/contrib/builder/api/data_sources/views.py are declared with a permission class that admits any caller, so a request carrying no credential reaches the handler. DataSourceService.dispatch_data_sources in backend/src/baserow/contrib/builder/data_sources/service.py then calls check_multiple_permissions without asking it to raise, and neither stores nor examines the mapping of denials it returns, so a denied check leaves execution to continue and the data source is dispatched whatever the caller's identity. The dispatch runs with the integration's own credentials, so an unauthenticated request naming a data source receives the rows and fields that source reads. Identifiers are small integers and can be enumerated. Version 2.3.1 passes raise_exception to the same call.

The Telnyx MCP server exposed its HTTP transport on every interface and did not require a caller credential. packages/mcp-server/src/http.ts served MCP on the root path with a listener bound to all interfaces and parsed the caller's authentication headers in a mode that did not fail when they were absent, so a request without any credential completed initialisation and dispatched tools. Dispatch forwarded the server's own stored credentials, the Telnyx API key and client secret together with the code-execution key, to the upstream endpoint, so an unauthenticated caller able to reach the port acted with them. The current code defaults the host to loopback, requires a server API key, and enforces it in middleware.

The execute_ruby tool is documented as a read-only Ruby sandbox and is enforced by a pattern denylist together with replacements for the process-spawning methods on Kernel. The pseudo-terminal library's spawn entry points are neither in the denylist nor replaced, so a normal tool call could reach them and start a shell, executing commands as the account running the server and outside the guarded methods. The denylist was introduced with the tool in 1.4.0 and never covered those entry points through 1.6.0. Version 1.6.1 restricts the requires the sandbox permits to a data-only list and blocks dynamic dispatch to execution entry points; 2.0.0 removes the tool.

ToolUniverse ran caller-supplied Python inside a sandbox that could be escaped, on a server that required no authentication. The executor behind the python_code_executor tool, in python_executor_tool.py, inspected the submitted source for a denied list of attribute names and calls but left the attribute-lookup builtins available and did not stop a dunder attribute reached through a string lookup or through a module already permitted, so a caller could walk from a literal's class to its base and enumerate subclasses to obtain a reference to the process and subprocess modules. A per-call argument also let the caller widen the import allow-list before the inspection ran. The HTTP and MCP servers in http_api_server.py and smcp_server.py bound to every interface with debugging enabled and no authentication, so any caller able to reach the port executed code as the server process. Version 1.3.0 adds bearer-token authentication, defaults the bind address to loopback, and hardens the attribute checks.

The mcp-router CLI served its MCP aggregator on every interface and enforced authentication only when the operator asked for it. The serve command in apps/cli/src/commands/serve.ts defaulted its host to the all-interfaces address on a fixed port, and required a token only when the corresponding flag was supplied, so a default invocation exposed the aggregator, and every MCP server it fronted, to anyone able to reach the port. Release 0.6.3 defaults the host to the loopback address and refuses to start without a token whenever the host it is given is not a loopback address; no earlier release carries either check.